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I. INTRODUCTION
Environmental policy tends to take a back seat to economic policy in
developing nations.' Such is the case with Chile, a country focused on developing
its economy and emerging as a stable nation well-respected in the international
community.2 However, neglect of the environment can persist only so long before
citizens stand up and take action to protect their health, welfare and surroundings.3
Chile, a third world nation devout with pollution, has suddenly emerged into the
modem environmental arena. Recently, Chilean citizens prevented a mega-forestry
project proposing to harvest their native forests. Despite the government's con-
centration on modernizing the economy, these citizens persevered and even took
their case all the way to the Chilean Supreme Court.
This Comment examines the recent Chilean Supreme Court Decision4 and the
subsequent environmental legislation making foreign investment and development
much more difficult in Chile.' Part II of this comment discusses the economic,
environmental and legal background of Chile. Understanding Chile's past treatment
of foreign investors enables the reader to speculate about the future treatment and
impact on foreign investment as a result of the recent Supreme Court decision. Part
III sets out the case and explains the Chilean Supreme Court's reasoning. Part IV
discusses the impact of the decision on foreign investment. Part V concludes this
Comment with some anticipated implications of the Supreme Court decision. In
order to understand the fundamentals of the case and the implications of the
decision, this Comment sets forth the necessary economic, environmental and legal
backgrounds.
1. See Joseph G. Block & Andrew R. Herrup, Symposium NAFTA atAge One: A Blueprintfor Hemispheric
Integration? L The Environment Side Agreement: Addressing Environmental Concerns Regarding Chilean
Accession to NAFTA, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 221 (1995) (establishing that Chile's unregulated growth resulted in
environmental problems for the nation).
2. See generally id. at 246 (describing Chile's substantial natural resource management problems in light
of its economical reliance on the exportation of raw goods).
3. L
4. RENACE (the National Ecology Action Network), Defensores del Bosque Chileno, Instituto de Ecologia
Politica and Coprique, Senator Horvath, Senator Diaz Deputy Girardi, and Deputy Navarro v. CONAMA and
COREMA, Decision Mar. 19, 1997 by the Third Courtroom of the Supreme Court of Chile, Santiago. Chile
[hereinafter CONAMA decision] (the nation of Chile is behind in publishing its Supreme Court decisions and thus
decisions are published up to July of 1996, however, there is a translated copy of this decision on file with The
Transnational Lawyer) (translated copy of the case obtained from Savia International, Ltd. a subsidiary of Trillium
Corporation).
5. See generally Array of 'Green' Headaches for Chile, New Environmental Rules Are Put to the Test,
LATINAMERICAREGIONALREPORTS: SouTHERN CONE (May 20, 1997) [hereinafter Array].
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Economic Background
Chile's economy has been the driving factor controlling its environmental legis-
lation.6 As a developing nation, Chile manifested a desire to improve its economy
by encouraging foreign investment through government subsidies and tax credits.7
However, such promotion of foreign investment took place without any regard for
environmental protections or concerns of resource exploitation
1. Chilean Economy
Chile maintains a strong and booming economy, surpassing its Latin American
neighbors.9 A generous endowment of natural resources provides the foundation for
the Chilean economy. ° Structurally, the economy is based largely on natural
resources,I' such as mining, forestry, 2 fishing, and agriculture.13 Predominately
6. See generally Scott C. Lacunza, From Dictatorship to Democracy: Environmental Reform in Chile, 19
HASTINNGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 539,542 (1996) (posing the notion that by focusing primarily on rapid economic
development, Chile neglected its environment in numerous ways).
7. Id.
8. See generally Lacunza, supra note 6, at 547 (theorizing that the push for economic growth and openness
of the free market system displaced any motivation for effective environmental regulation during the bulk of the
Pinochet years, resulting in Chile's lax enforcement of existing environmental laws). Furthermore, Chile's
economic focus began in the 1970s, whereas environmental legislation was not drafted until 1994. Id.
9. See John Otis, Forestry in Chile at Glance, (Jan. 1997) <http:llwww.atamericas.comlpages/
forglan.htm#Trillium> (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) [hereinafter Forestry in Chile] (depicting that
Chile's GDP growth averages 4% per year). With a population of 13.5 million inhabitants, Chile's small economy
has a gross domestic product (GDP) of approximately 40 billion dollars. Id.; see also Roberto Zahler, The
Background, Rationale, and Success of Chilean Economic Policy 16 LOY.L. A. INT'L&CoMP. L. 275,277 (1994)
(reporting that Chile's GDP per capita is about 3,000 dollars); see also John H. Christy, Opportunity: Chile Has
the Strongest Economy in Latin America, But You'd Never Know It From the Stock Market. Do Bargains Lurk?
FORBEs 374 (vol. 159, No. 8) (Apr. 21, 1997).
10. See generally Forestry in Chile, supra note 9 (noting that Chile has a total of 75.7 million hectares of
forest, 12% of which is managed as commercial timber). Chile produces 2% of the world's pulp in an industry in
which no one country produces more than 6%. Id.
11. Lacunza, supra note 6, at 546-47. See generally Sandra Orihuela, Latin America: A New Era For Mining
Investment, 30 INT'LLAw. 31, 44 (1996) (declaring that Chile currently supplies approximately 35% of the western
world's copper production).
12. Lacunza, supra note 6, at 546-47. See generally Forestry in Chile, supra note 9 (asserting that between
1975 and 1994, the Chilean forestry was a key growth area, boasting an average growth rate of 6.4% per year and
increasing the size of the industry by a total of 57%). Saw wood and pulp are the chief forest products and account
for 65.5% of total production in the industry. Id.
13. Lacunza, supra note 6, at 546-47. See Block & Herrup, supra note 1, at 253 n.176; see also Don
Podesta, South Americans Bank on NAFTA; Trade Pact's Pasage Viewed as Crucial of U.S. WASH. POST, Nov.
13, 1993, at A20 (quoting Wilfredo Marcelo of the Institute of Political Ecology).
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relying on the exportation of raw, un-processed goods, 14 Chile's economy remains
primitive.1 5 In contrast, the exportation of manufactured goods provides increased
value to a nation's economy, because such goods create jobs requiring people to
process the goods. t6 Thereby, the economy as a whole prospers from the exportation
of manufactured goods rather than raw materials.
1 7
Chile's free market model encouraged the exploitation of its natural resources"8
and discouraged governmental interference.1 9 The industries involved with ex-
ploiting natural resources are crucial to the Chilean economy, such that pressure to
minimize environmental impacts is not very influential." One of the major in-
dustries facing the dangers of exploitation in Chile is the timber industry.2' The
Chilean forestry industry, now the second largest export industry, generated over
US$1.2billion in exports in 1993.22 However, with dwindling forestry resources and
no plans for reforestation,23 Chile's heavy dependence on exploitation of natural
resources creates many environmental and economic problems.24 Aware of its
limited economy, the Chilean government attempts to strengthen its economy by
enticing foreign investors to its resource-rich nation.25
14. See Foreign Trade News Archives <http://www.gekkonet.com/CHIPtrade/trade.htm> (visited Jan. 26,
1998) (last updated Mfay 1997) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) [hereinafter Trade News] (relating
that minerals and ores accounted for close to half of the 1995 exports). Furthermore, food and agricultural products
made up more than one-quarter of the total 1995 exports. Id. Forest products comprised over fourteen percent of
all 1995 exports. Id.
15. See generally Block & Herrup, supra note 1, at 246 (claiming that Chile faces substantial natural
resource management questions because its economy is heavily weighted toward extractive industries); see also
Zahler, supra note 9, at 278; see also Chile: Overview of Recent Macroeconomic Performance and Trends
Chronicle of Latin America Economic Affairs (Sept. 21, 1995) [hereinafter Chile Overview] (illustrating Chile's
continued dependency on primary exports).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Lacunza, supra note 6, at 547. See generally Beth Ann Bivona, Regional Report: What Price Are We
Willing to Pay For Our Environment?, 5.DET. C.L. J. INT. L. & PRAc. 161, 172 (1996) (relating that according to
the Chile Ecology Action Network, 75% of the production forests have been destroyed, and more than half of the
protected forests have been cleared).
19. See Lacunza, supra note 6, at 543 (explaining that on September 11, 1973 General Agusto Pinochet
Ugarte, commander in chief of the Chilean army, overthrew Chile's constitutional government and seized power
through a bloody coup d'etat). Pinochet was a staunch laissez-faire capitalist, who concentrated on rapid economic
growth at all costs. Id. at 544. Pinochet eliminated price controls, reduced tariffs across the board, privatized most
of the state-owned enterprises, lowered taxes, liberalized investment rules, and reduced trade barriers. Id.
20. Block & Herrup, supra note 1, at 253.
21. Id.
22. Id. See David Pilling, The Chips are Down, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1994, at 10.
23. See NEwWEBsT s CoLLE-iATEDicTnoNARY990 (9th ed. 1991) (defining reforestation as the action
of planting need seeds or young saplings to replace the trees cut down).
24. Block & Herrup, supra note 1, at 253.
25. See generally Roger Turner, Chile: A Unique Paradigm in Latin America, BUSINESS AMERICA (Vol.
118, No. 4, ISSN: 0190-6275) (Apr. 1, 1997) (discussing Chile's economic growth in terms of increased foreign
investment).
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2. Chilean Foreign Investment
Chile's economic stability and impressive fourteen year consecutive economic
growth provides encouragement for foreign investment in Chile.26 As a nation with
few environmental restrictions and an advantageous tax system, Chile is an ideal
destination for foreign investors.27 Chile's steady economic growth and non-
discriminatory attitude towards foreign investment established reliability in the
international community.e In relation to other countries, Chile receives some of the
largest amounts of foreign investment, despite its past legislation.29 Until recently,
foreign capital had to stay in Chile for at least three years before it could be
remitted30 abroad.31 Today, however, remittance 32 is permitted after one year and
capital can be repatriated 33 in twenty-four hours.34 The ability to repatriate profits
appeals to investors, who would like to receive their earnings quickly. 35 Moreover,
the repatriation of profits encourages foreign investment because an investor's gain
is not required to remain in Chile.36 Consequently, Chile has the highest credit
rating of any Latin American nation, which ultimately entices foreign investors.37
26. See generally id. (setting forth that Chile has average annual GDP growth in excess of 6% since 1985,
with 7.2% in 1996). The largest portion of the new investment in 1996 was in the services sector, consisting of 51%,
followed by an increase of 19% in mining, and 18% in the industrial sector. Id. In fact, in 1996 there was a 51%
increase in foreign investment compared to the 1995 levels. Id.; see also Zahler, supra note 9, at 279 (declaring that
in 1994, foreign investment in Chile made up approximately 4% of its GDP, which is a very high rate on a
worldwide basis); see also Foreign Investment Jumps 51%, SOUTH AM. Rir., (Apr. 1, 1997) (Vol. 2, No. 8)
(declaring that the government's Foreign Investment Committee reported that foreign investment in Chile came to
US$4.578 billion, up 51% from 1995 figures). The main reason for the increase was Decree Law No. 600, which
made foreign investment easier. Id.; see also Chile: Economy Grows By Over 8% In Third Quarter, SOUTH AM.
Bus. INFORMATIoN, (Nov. 25, 1997) (stating that foreign investment in the third quarter grew by 15.4% far
exceeding the 9.4% growth of the second quarter). According to the Central Bank, 1997 was another prosperous
year for Chile with third quarter economic activity growing by 8.1%, which resulted in an average growth rate of
6%, even higher than the predicted growth rates. Id
27. See Chile Overview, supra note 15 (expressing that Finance Minister Eduardo Aninat emphasized that
Chile has recently been rated as one of the emerging market economies with the least risk for foreign investors).
In July 1995, Standard & Poor's, a major Wall Street risk analysis firm, upped Chile's rating from 'Triple B plus"
(BBB+) to "Single A minus" (A-), placing Chile in first place among all Latin American countries rated. Id.
28. Zahler, supra note 9, at 279.
29. Id. at 282.
30. See infra note 32 (providing the definition of remittance).
31. Zahler, supra note 9, at 283.
32. See BLAcK'sLAwDICIoNARY 1294 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "remittance" as money sent by one person
to another, whether in specie, bill of exchange, check or otherwise); see also Zahler, supra note 9, at 279
(establishing that remittance refers to sending Chilean money out of Chile and into other foreign nations).
33. See BLAcK'sLAwDIcToNARY 1294 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "repatriation" as the return of profits from
foreign investments to the investor's country).
34. Zahler, supra note 9, at 283.
35. See generally id. (addressing the process of profit remittance in Chile).
36. Id.
37. 7Turner, supra note 25.
249
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B. Environmental Background
International developers invest in nations with strong stable economies and a
political agenda that fosters their proposed development.38 Historically, Chile's
lenient policy towards environmental protection, in addition to its strong economy,
established an ideal location for foreign investors and developers.39 Such traits have
enticed United States based firms wishing to escape the harsh environmental laws
of their nation.4° However, in light of depleting resources and increased air4' and
water pollution,42 Chile was forced to restructure its environmental agenda.43
Bearing in mind such environmental progress, it is necessary to examine the
development of these environmental laws and how these new tough regulations will
affect current and future business ventures in Chile.44
1. Chile's Evolving Environmental Policy: From Pinochet to Present
As a developing nation, Chile's initial concern was improving its economy.45
Policies, such as environmental protection, were too expensive for such a poor
nation, and thus were not considered by the government.46 The quest for inter-
national recognition and a booming economy overshadowed concerns for impacts
on the environment and detriment to Chile's natural resources.47 As the government
passed hands, attention toward environmental concerns grew despite the govern-
38. See generally Zahler, supra note 9, at 275 (considering the background of Chile's economic policy).
39. See generally Trade News, supra note 14 (dealing with foreign investment in Chile).
40. Lacunza, supra note 6, at 542. See Block & Herrup, supra note 1, at 221 (asserting that the United
State's environmental regulations are more stringent then regulations found in Chile). In order to enter into trade
agreements with the U.S., Chile must restructure its environmental policies. Id.
41. See Block & Herrup, supra note 1, at 249-50 (describing Santiago's air pollution as among the worst
in the woild and so severe that many citizens wear gas masks). In fact, Santiago pollution meters regularly register
"critical" or "dangerous." Id.
42. See id. at 251 (stating that the copper and mining industries contribute heavily to water pollution in
Chile). In 1993, Chile's Health Ministry declared water contamination as the country's leading health problem. Id.
In fact, bioaccumulation of mercury and cadmium and other contaminants in seafood may threaten one of Chile's
export industries. Id.
43. See id. at 246 (establishing that Chile is making substantial efforts to identify and redress its
environmental problems). Steps toward environmental protectionism stem from Chile's desire to join NAFTA,
which is an issue out of the scope of this comment. Id.
44. See generally id. (explaining Chile's motivation to remedy its environmental problems comes form its
desire to ensure free trade with the United States).
45. See Lacunza, supra note 6, at 547.
46. See Steven G. Fishbach, The Quiet Revolution: Trade and Investment Liberalization in Chile and
Jamaica, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 527,542 (1996) (reporting that after the Pinochet regime and in light of a democratic
government, foreign investment continued and today Chile is arguably the most economically developed country
in Latin America).
47. See Orihuela, supra note 11, at 47.
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ment's goal to boost foreign investment.4  During the Pinochet era, the rapid
economic development overlooked the environment.49
Despite the prosperous economy, unregulated growth saddled the country with
serious environmental problems, including severe air pollution,50 extensive de-
forestation, and widespread water contamination.5 ' As described by the post-
military government, Chile's economic growth transpired at the expense of the
environment. Additionally, Chile cannot sustain such growth in the context of
dwindling natural resources. In light of the nature of the Chilean economy, which
is heavily weighted toward extractive industries, Chile faces substantial natural
52resource management questions.
2. The Importance of Maintaining the Environment-Sustainable
Development
In an attempt to address the problems associated with its unbridled growth, the
Chilean government created the National Environmental Commission
(CONAMA) 3 and the decentralized Regional Environmental Commission
(COREMA). 54 These agencies were formed to design an environmental policy that
coordinates ongoing ideas from business, academic, and public sectors.55 The
mission statement of these two commissions calls for what has been termed
"sustainable development. '56
48. See generally CHILELAWDIGESTREVISER, MARTINDALE-HUBBELLINTERNATIONALLAWDICIONARY
5 (defining foreign investment as any investment made with freely-convertible foreign exchange; new and used
foreign capital goods; various forms of capitalized technology and credits related to foreign investment).
49. See Block & Herrup, supra note 1, at 243,255.
50. See id. at 250 (discussing the severity of the air pollution problem in Chile).
51. Lacunza, supra note 6, at 542; see Block & Herrup, supra note 1, at 250 (describing the extent of the
water pollution problem in Chile).
52. See Block & Herrup, supra note 1, at 246 (explaining that Chile's economy, particularly its export
industries, depends heavily on exploitation of its natural resources). Environmental groups estimate that 90% of
Chile's exports come from natural resources. Id. Exploitation of these resources causes many environmental
problems, however the industries involved are so important to the Chilean economy, pressure to minimize
environmental impacts are not as strong as in other areas. Id.
53. See Carol Heitnam, Chile.Environmental Consulting Services, 1995 NAT. TRADEDATA BANK, MARKET
RPTs., at 12 (Nov. 21, 1995) (setting forth that the Comision Nacional de Medio Ambiente (CONAMA) was created
on June 5, 1990, as the governmental policy coordinating agency). CONAMA's mandate is to develop a unified
environmental legislative and administrative system, to coordinate and provide advice to the ministries that regulate
and enforce and whose areas of responsibility touch on environmental matters, and to supervise a national
environmental plan of action to make sure it all works. Id.
54. COREMA is the regional equivalent of CONAMA.
55. Otis, supra note 9.
56. Id. See Roger W. Findley, Legal and Economic Incentives for the Sustainable Use of Rainforests, 32
TEX. INT'L LJ. 17, 19-20 (1997).
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The Sustainable Chile program is an initiative between ecological organi-
zations, academics, and social leaders.57 This program exists to encourage the
social, political and economic transformation in Chile, from the current
development model to one which is oriented towards sustainability.58
In as early as 1994, the Environmental Framework Law provided a definition
of sustainable development.59 It is a process of sustained and equitable improvement
of the quality of life which must be founded in appropriate measures of con-
servation and protection of the environment without jeopardizing the expectations
of the future generations. 6° This definition, provided by Chilean law, accentuates
the need to apply appropriate measures of conservation 6' and protection of the
environment to create a suitable foundation for the sustainable development of
Chile's natural resources. 62 According to Chilean law, to satisfy the objectives of
sustainable development63 the government must allow for the regenerative capacity
of the resource, achieve an improvement of the environment and prevent the
possible deterioration of the environment. 64
C. Legal Background
Chile's legislation also contributes to attracting foreign investors.65 Two
primary legal mechanisms exist for actual foreign investment in Chile: the Foreign
Investment Statute66 and Chapter XIV of the Central Bank's Compendium of
Foreign Exchange Rules.67 However, in 1994 the Chilean legislature created an
57. Sustainable Chile, CHIPER, Environmental Reports Library Home Page (Oct. 6, 1997)
<http.//www.chiper.cllibrary/020.html> (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
58. Id.
59. Pedro Fernandez Biterlich, In the Wake of the Failure of the Second Earth Summit: How to Define
Sustainable Development in Chile? CHIPER, Environmental Reports Library Home Page (July 7, 1997)
<http.//www.chiper.cllibrary/009.html> (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (Author Pedro Fernandez
Biterlich is a Consultant in Environmental Law and also the former President of CODEFF).
60. Id.
61. Id. See La Ley Bases del Medio Ambiente (Basic Law on the Environment) No. 19,300, enacted March
9, 1994, arts. 2 and 41 [hereinafter EFL]. Conservationist actions are acceptable that permit the inclusion of uses,
rational exploitation and restoration in some cases, of the components of the environment whose goal is to assure
the permanence, regenerative capacity and associated biodiversity of the ecosystem. Id.
62. Id.
63. See generally id. (discussing that sustainable development provides for the use of resources in a
permanent form without compromising the expectations of future societies).
64. Id.
65. See Turner, supra note 25.
66. See Foreign Investment Law, Decreto Lay 600 (Decree 600), enacted July 11, 1974, (amended) Mar.
1993 [hereinafter DL 600]; see also Orihuela, supra note 1I, at 45.
67. See Orihuela, supra note 11, at 45; see also Turner, supra note 25.
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Environmental Framework Law to provide for the protection of the environmental
and natural resources of the nation.68
1. Chilean Investment Law
Chile's economy and legislation are designed to foster foreign investment.69
Furthermore, the process of investing in Chile furthers the nation's economic
agenda.70 The most important foreign investment mechanism utilized is the Foreign
Investment Statute. This statute provides for the formation of a contract between the
foreign investor and the Chilean State.7
As a means of attracting foreign investment, the Foreign Investment Statute
contains numerous inducements.72 First, investment is authorized by a contract
between the Chilean state and the investor.73 This contract specifies the rights and
duties of each party and represents the obligation of the Chilean state upon which
legal relief may be sought.74 An important characteristic of such contract is that it
cannot be modified unilaterally and therefore the investor is fully assured the terms
will remain stable.75 This contract provision is designed to protect the foreign
investor against subsequent changes in the law which might affect the terms under
Which the investment was made.76
The Foreign Investment Statute, via such contracts, addresses the right to
choose tax invariability of ten years.77 Pursuant to the statute, the investor may opt
to include in the investment contract a tax provision locking in for a ten, and in
some cases twenty, year period a prescribed income tax treatment for the invest-
68. See EFL, supra note 61; see also Block & Herrup, supra note 1, at 262 (illustrating that environmental
framework laws set out basic legal principles starting with declarations of policy and goals, followed by procedural
principles for environmental decision making). EFL consists of 93 articles, grouped into six larger titles, and ten
transitional articles. Id. According to the United Nations Environment Programme, framework laws are broader in
scope than environmental laws in the United States because framework laws do not create specific regulations. Id.
Framework laws organize and focus preexisting legislation. Id. The EFL is a compromise, reflecting concerns of
both environmental groups and business organizations. Id.
69. Id. Leon Larrain and Stuart Palmer, Chile Struggles to be a Center For International Investment. 4 J.
INT'LTAX'N 499 (Nov. 1993).
70. See Lacunza, supra note 6, at 544-45 (implying that liberalized investment rules allowed businesses to
operate unfettered and contributed to attracting US$6 billion in foreign investment from 1985 to 1996).
71. Orihuela, supra note 11, at 46.
72. World Bank Report on Chilean Debt Conversion, with Chilean Rules on Investments With Foreign Debt
Instruments and Provision in a Debt Restructuring Agreement For Such Investments, 26 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
Number 3, 819, 831 (May 1987) [hereinafter World Bank Report].
73. Id.
74. Orihuela, supra note 11, at 46.
75. Francisco Javier, Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Conference on Legal Aspects of Doing Business
in Latin America: Adapting to a Changing Legal Environment, 9 FLA. J. INT'L L. 1, 59 (1994).
76. World Bank Report, supra note 72, at 831.
77. Orihuela, supra note 11, at 46; Chile Investment Climate Statement for 1997, International Market
Insight Reports, (Thur., June 5, 1997) [hereinafter Chile Investment].
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ment.78 Foreign investors can opt for either national tax 79 treatment or a guaranteed
rate 0 for the first ten years of an investment.8t Chilean tax laws also encourage
foreign investment.82 Foreign investors and local businesses are treated equally, but
foreign investors can take advantage of fixed-rate tax options83 to limit liability
from future adverse tax changes.8 4 The desirability and flexibility of Chilean foreign
investment and tax laws contribute to Chile's increasing foreign investment levels.85
Secondly, the statute provides for a nondiscriminatory treatment provision
within the national industry. 6 Chile's Constitution establishes basic principles on
which foreign investors may rely, such as guaranteeing uniformity in application
of law to both Chileans and foreigners, 7 and prohibiting discrimination.8 The
investor is assured of non-discriminatory treatment in legal and regulatory
provisions affecting investment activities in Chile. 9 Therefore, foreign investors
and developers have an additional incentive to invest knowing that foreign cor-
porations will be treated no differently than resident corporations."'
Thirdly, in addition to both the choice of tax and the nondiscriminatory pro-
visions, the Foreign Investment Statute provides for the right to repatriate capital
after three years subject to its previous sale or liquidation.9' Pursuant to recent
amendments to the Foreign Investment Statute, the three year wait to repatriate
capital has been reduced to just one year.92 Although, Chile attempts to keep capital
78. World Bank Report, supra note 72, at 832.
79. See Chile Investment, supra note 77 (discussing that foreign investors may choose to have their profits
taxed at the rate that applies to local firms, the national tax rate, which is currently 35% on fully-distributed firms).
Unfortunately, Chile and the United States have no tax treaty, so U.S. investors' income may be taxed in both
nations. Id. However, the IRS typically grants credits for taxes paid in Chile. Id.
80. See id. (explaining that it is currently set at 42%).
81. Id.
82. Larrain & Palmer, supra note 69, at 499. See Edward A. Fallone, Latin American Laws Regulating
Foreign Investment, SB04 ALI-ABA-American Bar Assoc. Continuing Legal Education (July 8, 1996) (foreign
direct investment involves the ownership and control of the enterprise); see also Turner, supra note 25 (explaining
that Chile has the highest credit rating of any Latin America nation). This continues to attract foreign investors to
Chile. Id.
83. See generally Peter D. Byrne, Foreign Tax Problems of US Companies Doing Business in Latin
America, 50 U. MiAMI L. REV. 483,489 (1996) (discussing that Chile imposes a 15% tax rate on corporate earnings
and subjects dividends to personal income rates of up to 45%). A credit for tax paid at the corporate level is
allowed. Id. The bulk of Chilean tax is deferred until distribution. Id.
84. Larrain & Palmer, supra note 69, at 499.
85. See Lacunza, supra note 6, at 545-46; see generally Turner, supra note 25 (noting that Chile's economic
growth results from increased foreign investment).
86. See Lacunza, supra note 6, at 545-46; see also Orihuela, supra note 1I, at 46.
87. Constitucion Politica De la Republica [hereinafter Constitution] [CPE] Decreto Supremo No. 1.150, DE
1980 art.19. See Orihuela, supra note 12, at 46 (referring to non-Chileans as 'foreigners").
88. See Constitution, supra note 87, arts. 19,22, and 98; see also Orihuela, supra note 11, at 46.
89. World Bank Report, supra note 72, at 832.
90. See Orihuela, supra note 11, at 46; see also Chile Investment, supra note 84.
91. See Orihuela, supra note 11, at 46; see also Chile Investment, supra note 84.
92. World Bank Report, supra note 72, at 831.
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within its boundaries, it allows capital to leave the country after just one year.93 An
investor recognizes that his capital will return to his country and thus has a greater
incentive to invest in Chile.94
Finally, the Foreign Investment Statute addresses the right to remit profits.95
Restrictions on remittance rights are limited to a twenty-four hour prohibition on
profits.96 Chapter XIX of Banco Central de Chile's Compendium of Rules on Inter-
national Exchange enables a holder of foreign currency of Chilean debtors to
convert such paper into Chilean enterprises and permits.97 The ability to acquire
earnings within a day assures the return of profits to an investor's country, thus
motivating non-Chileans to invest in Chile.98
Because foreign investors are offered favorable terms regarding taxation,
expatriation of profits, legal protection, and respect for property rights, Chile has
attracted US$6 billion in foreign investment since 1985.99 Chiles's agenda has
focused on economic growth until the twentieth century, when air and water pol-
lution threatens the health and welfare of its citizens and depleting natural resources
threatens the continued economic prosperity."
2. Environmental Frame Work Law of 1994
Although the nation has enacted more than two thousand environmental laws,
until 1994 no organized framework for environmental administration or regulation
existed. Chile enacted the most comprehensive environmental protection measure
in the country's history, the Environmental Framework Law (EFL) of 1994, °10 in
order to provide stability and unity to the administration.102 The EFL sets out basic
legal principles, but does not attempt to codify all relevant statutory provisions, nor
93. See generally id. (providing that the Chilean government encourages foreign invest by imposing
legislation allowing for the repatriation of capital within three years).
94. Id.
95. See Orihuela, supra note 11, at 46; see also Chile Investment, supra note 77.
96. World Bank Report, supra note 72, at 831.
97. See id. at 830 (depicting that the remittance rights provided under Chapter XIX may be an added
incentive, and some Chilean residents may avail themselves of Chapter XIX procedures, perhaps utilizing shell
companies). Therefore, the approval procedures of Banco Central attempt to investigate the extent to which Chapter
XIX investors are indeed foreign. Id.
98. See generally Zahler, supra note 9, at 282 (setting forth profit remittance procedures in Chile).
99. See Lacunza, supra note 6, at 545-46; see also Turner, supra note 25 (noting for example that in 1996,
there was a46 percent increase in foreign direct investment, compared to 1995 levels). The largest portion of this
new investment, 54% was in the services sector, followed by an increase of 19% in mining and 18% in the
industrial section. Id.
100. See generally Block & Herrup, supra note 1, at 249-50 (illustrating the dangerous pollution levels in
Chile).
101. EFL, supra note 61. See Felipe Paez, Note, Environmental Framework Laws in Latin America, 13 PACE
ENvm L. REv. 625, 632-46 (1996).
102. Paez, supra note 101, at 632-46.
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does it create specific regulations.0 3 Nevertheless, the EFL accomplishes three
expansive objectives in Chile: (1) it implements a formal system of review of en-
vironmental impacts of proposed projects; (2) it redefines the role of CONAMA 104
and establishes regional environmental authorities; and (3) it allows for citizens
suits to be filed against all polluters, including the govemment. 0 5
The EFL establishes a system of environmental impact review, which applies
to significant investment projects. A study of environmental impact must be
prepared for any activity that could pose a risk to public health, have a significant
adverse effect on renewable natural resources, lifestyles, customs, or tourism, or
have other specified adverse impacts.'t6 Requiring environmental impact statements
(EIS) for any activity deemed a potential danger to health, tourism, or natural
resources is quite expansive."° Thus, an EIS may be required for any proposed
development activity in Chile.10 8 The creation of EISs are both timely and
expensive, serving as a potential deterrent for investment in Chile.'°9 The enactment
and enforcement of such a potentially powerful law can have great effects on the
economic development of Chile. 10 CONAMA created the EFL" in order to
organize Chile's existing environmental laws. 1 2 Most importantly, this new law
changed the procedures of reviewing the industrial effects on the environment.1
The Framework assigned responsibility for administration of the evaluation system
to the relevant Regional Commission on the Environment (COREMA) 14 for matters
affecting only one region, and to the National Commission on the Environment
103. See Block & Herrup, supra note 1, at 262 (setting forth the relative purposes of Environmental
Framework laws).
104. See Heitnam, supra note 53, at 12 (defining CONAMA as the National Environmental Commission).
105. Karrin Ranta, Comment, Balancing Hardrock Mining and the Environment: The Chilean Model, 6
COLD. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 423, 433 (1995). See Block & Herrup, supra note 1, at 263.
106. Paul J. Schlauch & Lawrence J. Jensen, Chilean Environmental Framework Law, 7 COLO, J. INT'L
ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 319 (1996). See EFL, supra note 61, tit. 11, para. 2, art. I1 (a)-(f); see also Paez, supra note 101,
at 634 n.63 (defining the criteria for the ETS as (a) a risk to health; (b) adverse effects on renewable natural
resources; (c) resettlement of communities, or any other alteration of peoples' lifestyles and customs; (d) proximity
to towns, protected areas, or resources that may be affected, considering the environmental value of the areas in
which the project or activity is to be implemented; (e) significant alteration of scenic or tourist values, measured
in terms of magnitude and duration; or (f) alteration of monuments).
107. See Paez, supra note 101, at 634 (detailing the criteria for an EIS); see also EFL, supra note 61, tit. II,
para. 2, arts. 8, 10(a)-(r) (defining EIS).
108. Id.
109. See Schlauch & Jensen, supra note 106, at 329 (speculating that the EFL's EIS requirement may have
an effect on business in Chile).
110. Paez, supra note 101, at 634.
111. EFL, supra note 68. See Ranta, supra note 105, at 423 n.80.
112. Ranta, supra note 105, at 432.
113. Id.
114. See Schlauch & Jensen, supra note 106, at 320 n.2 (explaining that the country of Chile is divided up
into several regions and thus to administer environmental laws, the Framework provided for the creation of regional
agencies to enforce the laws and evaluate the environmental impact studies). The COREMAs are the regional
branches of the agency, known as CONAMA. Id.
256
The Transnational Lawyer! Vol. 11
(CONAMA) it5 for activities effecting more than one region.116 CONAMA is respon-
sible for proposing environmental policies for the government, administering the
system of environmental impact review, and coordinating the process of developing
environmental quality standards
17
EISs are not mandatory for all operations, but are becoming increasingly nece-
ssary as both industry and environmental concerns grow. The EFL mandates an EIS
prior to approval of timber operations in certain situations: forestry development or
exploitation projects; in fragile soils or lands covered by native forests; and
cellulose, paper pulp and paper industries, chip plants, plants for working wood, and
sawmills, all of an industrial size."t8 Furthermore, an EIS must consider the
following: "(1) description of the project; (2) base line data; (3) detailed
description of effects, characteristics or circumstances that give rise to a need for
an EIS; (4) a forecast of environmental impact of the project, including eventual
risks; 120 (5) steps that will be taken to minimize the adverse effects of the project
and restoring actions that will be performed, when pertinent; (6) a follow-up plan
of the relevant environmental variables that give rise to the EIS; and (7) a plan for
fulfillment of applicable environmental legislation.'
121
Under this new system of environmental review and regulation, an EIS is
required for proposed projects that may cause an environmental impact and major
projects, including mines and smelters, wastewater treatment plants, reclamation
projects, and tailing ponds.'2
Pursuant to Article XI of the EFL, an EIS, as opposed to a declaration, must be
submitted if the project: (1) poses a risk to human health; (2) may have a significant
adverse effect on the quantity or quality of renewable natural resources; (3) involves
the re-settlement of human communities or alteration of their lifestyles or customs;
(4) may significantly alter the land-scape or value of an area for tourism; (5) may
adversely affect population, resources, or protected areas; or (6) may cause
115. See id. (setting forth that CONAMA was established in 1990 and operates on a decentralized basis,
subject to supervision of the President of the Republic through the Secretariat General of the Ministry of the
Presidency). This agency is administered by an executive director and controlled by its executive council. Id.
116. Id. at 320.
117. Id. at 320 n.2. See EFL, supra note 61, art. LXXI; see also Heitnam, supra note 53, at 12.
118. Id. See EFL, supra note 61, tit. II, para. 2, art. 10(m).
119. See Schlauch & Jensen, supra note 106, at 320 (setting forth that an EIS must describe in detail the
characteristics of the proposed activity or project); EFL, supra note 61, arts. 1 II, and XIII.
120. See Schlauch & Jenson, supra note 106, at 320 (explaining that an EIS must analyze and evaluate its
environmental impacts and potential risks); see also EFL, supra note 61, arts. II and XIII.
121. Id. See EFL, supra note 61, tit. II, para. 2, art. 12(a)-(g); see also Paez, supra note 101, at 634 n.64.
122. See Schlauch & Jensen, supra note 106, at 322 n.3; see also EFL, supra note 61, art. X (describing
projects and activities such as airports, highways, ports, regional development plans, mining activities, oil and gas
pipelines, industrial plants, activities in national parks, reserves, monuments, or other protected areas and the
manufacturing, transporting, storing, disposing of, or recycling of toxic, radioactive, or dangerous substances are
subject to environmental impact review).
123. Ranta, supra note 105, at 433.
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alteration of monuments, places of archeological, anthropological, or historical
value, or places of cultural significance.' 24
Based upon legislation in effect at the time of the project, proposed projects
falling into a "risk" category, such that they could negatively effect the environ-
ment, had to prepare and submit an EIS. Prior to the adoption of the EFL, many
companies were already completing voluntary EISs so as to help speed up
CONAMA's approval process.
After a completed study or declaration was submitted to either COREMA or
CONAMA, the agency had 120 days to review any studies and sixty days to review
any declarations. Once approved, COREMA or CONAMA, may require any other
state organization to issue the necessary permits or determinations. This complex
approval process, coupled with problems inherent in the environmental evaluation
system, gave rise to the dispute between environmental groups and the govern-
mental agencies responsible for approving EISs.t' 5
Finally, the EFL established citizens suits, allowing citizens and environmental
groups to use the courts to challenge polluters.126 As long as the citizen can prove
that the proposed project may have adverse impacts, the developer would be
required to halt his project until an EIS is compiled and approved by CONAMA or
COREMA. 127 This law provided environmentalists with a powerful tool to prevent
projects detrimental to the environment. 28
mH. THE CASE: RENANCE V. CONAMA
On October 6, 1993 CONAMA established guidelines to evaluate EISs
submitted to the agency. 29 These guidelines were created in response to complaints
that the draft EFL 30 neglected to specify what procedures to follow when reviewing
EISs.' 31 Since 1993, CONAMA and COREMA have approved numerous projects
and subsequently approved an EIS submitted by a United States Forestry Company
124. EFL, supra note 61, art. XI. See Ranta, supra note 105, at 433; see also Schlauch & Jensen, supra note
106, at 322 n.3.
125. Verdict in the Trillium Case to be Postponed Until March <http:llwww.atamericas.com/
pages/news/970131/tril.htm> (Jan. 31, 1997) (translated version from El Diario) (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer) [hereinafter Verdict].
126. See Block & Herrup, supra, note 1, at 263 (describing EFL's creation of citizen suits).
127. See generally EFL. supra note 61 (discussing the conditions under which an EIS must be filed).
128. See generally Block & Herrup, supra note 1, at 263 (outlining the provisions of the EFL).
129. CONOMA Creates Guidelines to Evaluate Environmental impact Studies, ENVIRONMENT WATCH LATIN
AMERICA CurFER INFORMATION, Nov. 1, 1993 [hereinafter ENVIRONMENT WATCH].
130. As of October 1993, Chile's Environmental Law Framework was only in draft form, awaiting enactment
as legislation.
131. ENVIRONMENT WATCH, supra note 129.
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proposing to develop Chile's Tierra del Fuego. 132 As provided in the EFL,
enviromental groups, along with Chilean legislators, 133 brought suit against the
government for approving an illegal EIS. 134
This suit pertains to an administrative decision handed down by both
CONAMA and COREMA approving an EIS.135 Although the central issue of the
case involves Trillium's Rio Condor Project, Trillium was not a party to the suit.136
The parties to the lawsuit were Chilean legislators137 and environmental groups,
such as RENACE, 31 who sued the governmental agencies, CONAMA and
COREMA, for approving a project which would be detrimental to the Chilean en-
vironment.139 Environmentalists argue that CONAMA and COREMA did not have
any legal authority to approve the EIS because there were no regulations setting
forth approval guidelines.' 40 However, defendants, CONAMA and COREMA, argue
that they have legal authority pursuant to a Presidential Order.' 4' The dispute
focuses on the lack of environmental regulations and does not pertain to the virtues
or deficiencies of the Rio Condor Project. 42 The decision pronounced by the Third
Courtroom of the Supreme Court of Chile dated March 19, 1997, with 3 votes in
favor and 2 against, declared illegal and arbitrary the resolutions from the
COREMA XII Region and CONAMA in respect to the Rio Condor Forestry
Project. 143
132. Environmentalists Achieve Legal Decision to Stop Forestry Mega-Project CHIPER, Environmental
Reports Library <http://linux.soc.uu.se/mapuche/fakta/bosqu02.html> (Apr. 28, 1997) (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer) [hereinafter Environmentalists Achieve].
133. Senators Horvath and Diaz and Deputies Girardi and Navarro.
134. Environmentalists Achieve, supra note 132.
135. Telephone interview with Karen Cohn, an employee of Savia International, Ltd., which is a subsidiary
of Trillium Corporation (Oct. 22, 1997).
136. Environmentalists Achieve, supra note 132. See Valparaiso, March'19, 1997 House of Representatives,
Chile; Deputy Ivan De ]a Maza M., President of the Comision de Recursos Naturales, Bienes Nacionales y Medio
Ambiente (Commission for Natural Resources, National Assets and Environment) [hereinafter Valparaiso].
137. Senator Horvath, Senator Diaz, Deputy Girardi, and Deputy Navarro.
138. See generally RENACE, Red Nacional deAccionEcologica, Chilean Environmental Groups Home Page
<http://www.chiper.c/renance/> (visited Oct. 27, 1997) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (defining
RENACE as the National Ecology Action Network, a network of 140 Chilean citizen organizations working in
Latin America for the protection of the environment and quality of life).
139. See Environmentalists Achieve, supra note 132.
140. See CONAMA decision, supra note 4 (laying out the arguments of the parties and providing the Chilean
Supreme Court's decision); see also Environmentalists Achieve, supra note 132.
141. See CONAMA decision, supra note 4 (providing defendant's arguments and the Supreme Court's
treatment of such arguments).
142. See Valparaiso, supra note 136 (explaining that "the mentioned decision was not directly given on the
Rio Condor project, regarding its virtues, deficiencies, measures for the preservation of species or management
plans but has legally objected to the application of law No. 19,300 on 'Bases del Medio Ambiente,' by contending
that its article Ist transitory expresses that the System of Environmental Assessment, regulated in Title II of the
mentioned body of law, will come in effect once the regulation referred to in article 13 of same is published in the
'Diario Oficial').
143. Id.
1998 /Mandatory Environmental Impact Statements In Chile
A. Facts
In 1994, Forestal Trillium, Ltd.,t44 a Washington State, U.S.-based corporation,
proposed plans to harvest native hardwood forests in the island of Tierra del Fuego
located in the extreme south of Chile. 45 In 1993, Trillium invested US$250 million
in Chile by purchasing 258,000 hectares on the island of Tierra del Fuego.1
46
Trillium received enormous support and encouragement from the Chilean govern-
ment. 47 In fact, the government sold the property to Trillium for US$48 per
hectare,148 which was significantly lower that the market value of approximately
US$117 per hectare.149 Additionally, government subsidies in the form of tax
rebates and exemptions would provide Trillium with 55 billion pesos over the next
20 years.150 However, despite the government's endorsement, environmental groups
opposed Trillium proposed logging plan.
5 1
1. Trillium's Proposed Rio Condor Project
Trillium planned to log one of the most remote places on the planet in a manner
so as to potentially set a new environmental standard for the world. With a purchase
price of US$42 million for 825,000 acres, Trillium can afford to try good forestry.
Despite approval already granted, Trillium refrained from logging and voluntarily
invited public scrutiny of their timber operation.15 1 In furtherance of Trillium's
dedication to the environment, they voluntarily submitted an EIS, in spite of Chile's
lack of comprehensive environmental laws or regulations.
Included in the voluntary EIS was a description of the project, which consisted
of the exploitation of largely virginal lands, construction of hundreds of miles of
144. See Bill Dietrich, Chile's 7terra Del Fuego: Harvest With Care, THE SEATrLETIMES (Sunday, January
26, 1997) (noting that Trillium is a United States corporation based in Bellingham, Washington). David Syre,
Chairman of Trillium corporation, boughthis timber empire in Tierra del Fuego on a weekend, based on a telephone
call two of his foresters placed from Punta Arenas, Chile. Id.
145. See generally Selected Environmental Events in the Western Hemisphere, 1995, 7 COLO. J. OF INT'L &
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 225, 230 (1996) [hereinafter Environmental Events] (explaining that Tierra del Fuego's forests
consists primarily of the lenga, a slow-growing beech tree that needs 120 years to reach maturity and great size);
see also Chilean Native Forests Dwindle as Debate Rages WORLDwIDE FOREST/BIODIVERSITY CAMPAIGN NEWs,
Home Page (Apr. 17, 1996) (© Reuters; Porvenir, Chile) <http:llforests.org/gopher/samerica/childeba.txt> (copy
on file with The Transnational Lawyer) [hereinafter Native Forests].
146. See Dietrich, supra note 144; see also Environmental Events, supra note 145, at 230.
147. Environmentalists Achieve, supra note 132.
148. See Environmental Events, supra note 145, at 230 (maintaining that this figure is based on a price per
acre, in which Trillium bought a total of 825,000 acres at approximately US$48-51 per acre); see also Dietrich,
supra note 144.
149. Environmentalists Achieve, supra note 132.
150. Id.
151. Id. See Trillium Project Tests Legislation CHIP News Home Page <http://www.chip.cl/news/
1997/2/26/nl.html> (Feb. 26, 1996) (translated in English from the Chilean newspaper, LA EPOCA) (copy on file
with The Transnational Lawyer) [hereinafter Trillium Project].
152. See generally id. (claiming that Trillium praised their project as being beneficial to the environment).
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logging road, extraction of millions of trees, and the erection of a large lumber
mill.t53 Considering that the vast exportation of raw materials dominates Chile's
economy, construction of a lumber mill enabling the exportation of finished
products could be an enormous improvement for the Chilean economy. 54 The
project expected to export the lenga's reddish brown hardwood in the form of
furniture, doorjambs, and finished wood.155 The production of finished products is
just one benefit, the development of a primitive portion of the nation, coupled with
the creation of approximately 800 jobs for Chilean citizens further adds to the
desirability of the Trillium Project. t5 6
Trillium employed the services of Claudio Donoso, an Austrian University
researcher and one of Chile's best-known forest ecologists, to join with a com-
mission of 100 of Chile's leading scientists to produce an EIS.117 Trillium directed
the comnission to comprise a plan that would allow the harvesting of 350,000 acres
of the forest while at the same time limiting damage to the ecosystem. 5 8 The
commission's plan provided that Trillium will "shelter cut""1 9 to maintain thirty
percent of the forest in age, type, and distribution.' 60 Research comprised by the
commission showed the selective cutting would allow the lenga to naturally reseed
and would provide more sunlight to the grove and thereby quicken growth of the
new trees.16 1 In furtherance of its commitment to ecologically sound practices,
Trillium pledged to implement a permanent monitoring system and to stop
harvesting if the lenga do not regenerate.162
In addition to the submission of an EIS, Trillium continued its pursuit of
environmental protectionism by subscribing to the Green Certificate system.
Trillium planned to capitalize on the demand for environmentally sound products,
by placing a green seal on the wood to indicate that it was harvested in an
ecological manner. By deciding to pursue a Green Certificate from international
environmental organizations, Trillium invited environmental scrutiny to a project
in so remote a location only its few inhabitants were concerned about it. Chilean
law clearly states that CONAMA and COREMA have the power to approve
153. Id.
154. See generally id. (discussing the benefits of the proposed Trillium project).
155. See generally id. (Syre planned to make products out ofthe beautiful lenga wood rather than wood chips
as was the plan by the previous owner of the acres).
156. See generally id. (setting forth the positive aspects of Trillium's proposed forestry project in Chile); see
also Environmental Events, supra note 145, at 230 (discussing the proposed Trillium project).
157. Environmental Events, supra note 145, at 230.
158. See id. (claiming that in spite of Donoso's preference to preserve Chile's remaining forests, he saw the
commission's plan as a compromise between banning all logging and leaving timber companies unregulated).
159. See id. at 230 (defining shelter cut as selectively cutting trees in a manner so as to provide a beneficial
setting for regrowth of new saplings).
160. Id.; see also Native Forests, supra note 145 (explaining Chilean forestry).
161. Environmental Events, supra note 145, at 230. But see generally Native Forests, supra note 145
(suggesting that no one really knows how the lenga ecosystem works and thus more research needs to be done
before the forest can be harvested safely).
162. See Environmental Events, supra note 145.
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projects, and should consider political, social, and environmental factors. 63 In fact,
Trillium announced environmental practices that go beyond the requirements of
Chilean law.164
2. Proceedings Regarding Trillium's Voluntary EIS
On April 3, 1996, the Regional Environmental Commission, COREMA Region
XII, approved Trillium's Project.1 65 This decision contradicted important studies
that recommended the project not be undertaken for technical reasons.6 The
COREMA Region XII Technical Committee, made up of fourteen government pro-
fessionals, along with appointees from the National Environmental Commission,
CONAMA, wrote a 26-page report.1 67 This report contained over six pages relating
to positive environmental aspects, however eighteen pages of the report criticized
the project based upon technical shortcomings related to lenga exploitation. 6 ' This
report also stated that Trillium provided an EIS which included an insufficient
inventory of existing trees "which is the basis for an environmental evaluation of
a project.' ' 69 The report found serious problems with the EIS harvest simulation
model because it did not specify a plan to preserve the original biodiversity and it
lacked data on tree growth and regeneration cycles.1 70 Since the lenga trees require
120 years to reach maturity, any study complied over the course of a couple years
cannot accurately depict the regeneration and regrowth of these valuable trees.171
The Technical Committee concluded the restoration, mitigation and monitoring
measures were not adequate, thereby sufficient elements to approve the viability of
the Rio Condor Project did not exist. 72
3. Environmental Opposition to Trillium's Project
From the onset, environmental groups were cynical about the Rio Condor
Project because of Trillium's past record of forestry practices in the United
163. See Otis, supra note 9 (quoting Ron Packard, Trillium's General Manager, who said that the company
has a very strong defense). Furthermore, Packard believes the environmental claims against the study are invalid
since the ecological analysis done for the Rio Condor project is more than has ever been done before in Chile. Id.
164. Trillium Project, supra note 151.
165. Environmentalists Achieve, supra note 132.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See Environmentalists Achieve, supra note 132 (explaining that the study done over 18 years was not
adequate according to environmental groups who argued the lenga requires hundreds of years to mature).
172. Id.
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States. 173 Environmental groups were already concerned with forestry projects
because 80% of Chile's 17.5 million acres of native forests are owned by private
entities such as Trillium.174 Focusing on the ancient pristine forests of Tierra del
Fuego, environmentalists were skeptical of the proposed sustainable development
plan.175 Ecologists argued that more research about the lenga forest ecosystem needs
to be complied before sustainable development can take place. 76 Furthermore, the
difficulty of enforcing legislation in such an inaccessible location as Tierra del
Fuego also contributed to skeptical attitude towards the project.177
Environmental groups, along with four legislators, appealed the COREMA
decision permitting the development of Tierra del Fuego. 178 Strong opposition for
the project arose because Trillium could not guarantee a sustainable exploitation of
Chile's native forests.179 Opponents of the project argued that COREMA ignored
findings by its own technical team'80 concluding the Rio Condor Project was not
environmentally sustainable.'' The Technical Committee of COREMA listed
twenty points in Trillium's EIS as inadequate. 82 The report from the Technical
Committee found serious problems with the EIS' harvest simulation model, such
that it did not specify how the original forest biodiversity would be conserved.8 3
Moreover, the Technical Committee concluded that the data on tree growth within
regeneration cycles was lacking because it was based on limited experiments and
thus was irrelevant to extensive forestry projects such as Rio Condor.'
Environmental groups argued that CONAMA and COREMA violated the EFL
by arbitrarily endorsing the Rio Condor Project without adequately studying pos-
173. See Trillium Project, supra note 151 (depicting the French National Forests Office and Argentine
environmentalist, Jorge Morello, production of technical studies that supported arguments against the Rio Condor
project).
174. See generally Native Forests, supra note 145 (illustrating environmental concern for Chile's depleting
resources).
175. See generally id. (quoting Manuel Baquedano, director of the Political Ecology Institute in Santiago,
Chile, who fears that exploitation ofTierra del Fuego could one day leave the area like central Chile, where decades
of logging has reduced the once vast stands of redwood and larch to isolated pockets).
176. See generally id. (suggesting that the current research pertaining to lenga forests is inadequate).
177. Trillium Project, supra note 151.
178. Trillium Appeal Rejected FORESTRY NEWS 1996, CHIP Home Page
<http://www.gekkoneLcon-lCHIPtrade/nwsFR6.htm> (visited Jan. 26, 1998) (translated news from ELMERCURIO
and EL DIARIO, Chilean newspapers) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) [hereinafter Trillium Appeal].
179. Id.
180. See Environmentalists Achieve, supra note 132 (explaining that the technical committee is comprised
of fourteen government professionals representing different agencies and differing areas of expertise). The twenty-
six page report was written by the technical committee together with local appointees from CONAMA. Id.
181. TrilliumAppeal, supra note 178; Trillium Project, supra note 151.
182. Trillium Project, supra note 151. But see Environmentalists Achieve, supra note 132 (stating that the
report contained six and a half pages related to "positive environmental aspects" of a general nature, the report also
contained eighteen pages of criticism concerning technical shortcomings of the project related to lenga
exploitation).
183. Environmentalists Achieve, supra note 132.
184. Id.
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sible adverse impacts.'85 The report from CONAMA's Technical Committee
concluded that the EIS did not establish a system to weigh the extraction impacts,
nor did it allow for impact mitigation. 86 A Chilean newspaper, La Nacion, that
published the Technical Committee's conclusions, proved to be a key document for
opponents of COREMA's approval of the EIS for the Rio Condor forestry project.187
4. CONAMA and COREMA 's Defense
In response to the suit brought by environmentalists, CONAMA and COREMA
argue that appellants did not have standing to sue and that they had authority to
approve of EISs pursuant to a Presidential Order.'8s Defendants assert appellants 9
lacked standing because they were not residents of the island of Tierra del Fuego
and therefore did not demonstrate a legitimate interest in preventing the proposed
Rio Condor Project.' 90 The conflicts between environmentalists wishing to prevent
the project and the government wanting to encourage investment and development
led to the battle over the approval of Trillium's EIS.' 9'
B. Procedural History
In February 1995, COREMA t92 approved Trillium's first EIS.' 93 On May 8,
1996, the National Ecology Action Network (RENANCE) and three member
organizations: Defensores del Bosque Chileno, Instituto de Ecologia Politica and
Coprique, together with the Deputies Girardi and Navarro filed legal suit called a
Resource Protection to stop the project. 94 On May 9, 1996 the Court accepted the
petition, thereby halting the project pending a judgment, but the Resource
185. Chilean Supreme Court Rejects Controversial Trillium Logging Project CIEL Home Page,
<http'//www.econet.apc.org/ciel/trillium.html> (Mar. 21, 1997) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer)
[hereinafter Chilean Supreme Court].
186. Environmentalists Achieve, supra note 132.
187. Id.
188. See generally CONAMA decision, supra note 4 (laying out the defense put forth by CONAMA and
COREMA).
189. Id. Senator Horavth, Senator Diaz, Deputy Girardi, and Deputy Navarro. Id.
190. See CONAMA decision, supra note 4, Dissenting opinion's 6th and 7th points, at p. 8 of the translated
version of the decision (setting forth the dissenting opinion provided by the Minister Mr. Osvaldo Faundez and the
Member Lawyer Mr. Manuel Daniel). The dissent claims that "appellants, congressmen domiciled at the National
Congress, Valparaiso, and other persons who give as their domicile the city of Punta Arenas ... do not demonstrate
in what way they have been affected, because in reality they do it indeterminately, in the interest of the community,
thus lacking active legitimization to ask for the legal protection they request." Id.
191. See generally id. (discussing the Chilean Supreme Court's treatment of the arguments from the
environmental groups and from CONAMA and COREMA).
192. Region XI Environmental Commission (COREMA).
193. Environmentalists Achieve, supra note 132.
194. Id.
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Protection was denied.' 95 The denial of the Resource Protection motivated Senators
Horvath and Diaz, together with Deputies Girardi and Navarro, to present yet
another Resource Protection against CONAMA.1 6 The rejection of this second suit
prompted environmental groups to appeal to the Chilean Supreme Court.
197
Later in 1996, CONAMA approved Trillium's EIS, which prompted opponents
to file suit in October 1996 arguing the approval was illegal. 98 Environmental
groups and pro-environment deputies requested a writ of protection' 99 to prevent
Trillium from continuing with its Rio Condor Project in Tierra del Fuego. 200 In May
of 1996, the Puntas Arenas Court of Appeals temporarily halted the project after the
Pro-Defense for the Environment Movement, along with several environmental
groups, filed a protective action against the court.201 Subsequently, the First Branch
of the Santiago Court of Appeals unanimously rejected the opposition's appeal for
an injunction reasoning that CONAMA approved the project pursuant to certain
requirements utilizing various studies and plans to mitigate environmental im-
pacts.202 Although the writ was denied, the court granted a motion for an injunction,
pending the Chilean Supreme Court decision. 20 3 Finally, in March of 1997, the
Chilean Supreme Court ruled against Trillium's first EIS. °4
Upon looking at the translated text of the case, no previous cases were men-
tioned. In fact, this case is the first case of its kind to reach the Chilean Supreme
Court.205 Rarely in Chile have cases pertaining to the environment ever reached the
Supreme Court.20
6
C. Decision
By a 3-2 vote, the Supreme Court held the project approval by COREMA and
CONAMA was illegal because, due to a lack of regulations, legislation covering
195. Id.
196. Id. See Trillium Appeal, supra note 178.
197. Environmentalists Achieve, supra note 132.
198. See Supreme Court Sinks Trillium Project: Rules Government Must Establish EIS Regulations (Mar.
20, 1997) <http://www.gekkonet.con/CHPtradenews_FR7l.htm> (translated news from EL MERCURIO) (copy
on file with The Transnational Lawyer) [hereinafter Supreme Court Sinks] (declaring that because of Trillium's
proposed project, environmental groups have sparked opposition to development in Chile).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Otis, supra note 9.
202. Supreme Court Sinks, supra note 198. See Trillium Appeal, supra note 178 (outlining the procedural
history of the CONAMA decision).
203. Supreme Court Sinks, supra note 198.
204. See Trillium Submits Second EIS for Condor Project (Aug. 27, 1997)
<http://www.gekkonet.com/CHIPtmde/news._FR72.htm> (translated news from EL MERCURIO and EL DMIAO,
Chilean newspapers) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) [hereinafter Trillium Submits] (stating Trillium
has submitted a second EIS to COREMA).
205. See Environmentalists Achieve, supra note 132.
206. Id.
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EISs was not applicable.20 7 The Court stated the approval was arbitrary and con-
tradicted all the technical recommendations, and furthermore, the information
presented in the EIS was insufficient to make a decision on the sustainability of the
project because the continued existence of the forestry resource was not affirmed. 0 8
In fact, the majority held that CONAMA and COREMA, by approving the Rio
Condor Project, infringed articles 6 and 7 of the Constitution of the Republic which
established that state institutions must subject their action to the Constitution and
to the rules prescribed according to it.20 The majority rejected appellant's 210 argu-
ment that the Presidential Order, issued on September 30, 1993, established
regulations referring to those who voluntarily submit an EIS.21 The court found that
environmental authorities cannot dictate the viability of a project without
established regulations. Despite the existence of the Framework which defines
EISs, the government had not created norms for such procedures.2 3
As a landmark decision in the environmental arena, the majority held that in
actions involving environmental protection, the general appeal for protection
requires the action be illegal, arbitrary, and lack reasonable grounds.2'4 The court
relied upon principles found in the Constitution and in EFL in order to conclude that
all persons have the collective public right to the community as a whole, thereby
satisfying the standing requirement.215 Reasoning that the Constitution applies to
"all persons," the Court concluded that all Chilean citizens have the right to be
protected and the right to appeal for such protection.21 6 Essentially, this decision
207. Id. See CONAMA decision, supra note 4, at the 6th point of the majority opinion (holding that as
previously state, Law 19,300 regarding the ElSs is not in effect and, by not being so, the appealed institution could
not issue the resolution contested by these means, basing itself on antecedents that, for now, are not contemplated
in the law, and by doing do, it is evident that it incurred an illegal act).
208. Environmentalists Achieve, supra note 132.
209. See CONAMA decision, supra note 4, at the 6th point of the majority opinion (holding also that these
institutions must act validly within their competence and in the manner prescribed by law and, any act contravening
these articles is null and will impose the responsibilities and sanction which the law establishes); Constitution, supra
note 87, arts. 6 and 7.
210. CONAMA and COREMA are appellants in this Supreme Court case.
211. See CONAMA decision, supra note 4, at the 7th point of the majority opinion (noting that "it is known
that only through law or other legal norms, decree or regulation, can specific restrictions or condition be established
for the exercise of determined rights or freedoms, but under no circumstances through a Presidential Order").
212. See Supreme Court Sinks, supra note 198 (declaring that because of Trillium's proposed project,
environmental groups have sparked opposition to development in Chile); see also CONAMA decision, supra note
5, at 6th point of the majority (holding that "as previously state, Law 19,300 regarding the EISs is not in effect and,
by not being so, the appealed institution could not issue the resolution contested by these means, basing itself on
antecedents that, for now, are not contemplated in the law, and by doing do, it is evident that it incurred an illegal
act").
213. Supreme Court Sinks, supra note 198.
214. See CONAMA decision, supra note 4, at 8th point of the majority opinion (determining, according to
the 9th point of the decision, that the resolution contested by these means of protection is both illegal and arbitrary),
215. See id at 12th and 13th points of the majority opinion (providing that "the right to live in a pollution-
free environment, pursuant to Art. 19, No. 8 of the Constitution, is a human right with constitutional standing,
which acts with a dual nature: a public subjective right and a collective public right").
216. Id
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creates citizen suits in cases where the protection of the environment is at issue.2 17
According to the opinion, appellants have the right to push for preservation of
nature and the conservation of the environmental heritage, an activity no longer
limited to those living close to the projects 8
Besides the three votes in favor of striking down CONAMA's and COREMA's
approval, two dissenting votes believed the appealed decision must be confirmed
and the approval of the EIS upheld.2 19 The dissent agrees with CONAMA and
COREMA that appellants lacked standing to sue.220 According to the dissent, in
order to file an appeal for protection the appellants must be a "specific damaged
individual" acting in the legitimate exercise of his right.221 Furthermore, dissenters
claim that although the approval may satisfy the illegality requirement, it cannot be
considered arbitrary. 2 CONAMA's and COREMA's approval of Trillium's EIS
was not arbitrary because the public institutions made a rational, researched
decision.2  According to the dissent, a erroneous decision is not synonymous with
- 224an arbitrary decision.
In short, the Chilean Supreme Court held the approval of Trillium's EIS by
CONAMA and COREMA was both arbitrary and illegal because these public
institutions did not have any legal guidelines to follow for determining approval.'
IV. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
The conflict between environmental groups and development appears to have
been resolved as a result of the recent CONAMA decision.226 Environmental
watchdogs were given a great deal of power with this decision and resulting
legislation that codified citizen suits.227 The major implication of this case was the
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See generally CONAMA decision, supra note 4 (providing the dissenting opinion and its rationale).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 7th point of the dissenting opinion.
222. See generally id. at the 5th point of dissenting opinion (indicating that the aggravating act must be both
illegal and arbitrary pursuant to article 20 of the Chilean Constitution). "In the opinion of the dissenting parties,
there is no question of attributing arbitrariness to the objected resolution, as it has not been an act which comes from
mere whim or irrationality; on the contrary, although mistaken, it has been dictated after a procedure fundamentally
based on what the laws has contemplated and which must be applied in due course." Id.; see also Constitution,
supra note 87, art. 20.
223. See CONAMA decision, supra note 4.
224. Id.
225. See generally id. (rejecting CONAMA's and COREMA's approval of Trillium's EIS).
226. See generally it (holding that CONAMA and COREMA had no authority to approve of voluntary EIS).
As a result, the Chilean legislature amended its laws so as to provide for mandatory EISs. Id.; see also Valparasio,
supra note 136.
227. See CONAMA decision. supra note 4; see also Valparaiso, supra note 136.
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revision of Chile's Environmental Framework Law.228 As a result of this decision,
the Chilean parliament amended the existing law so as to provide for mandatory
EISs. 9 The law will provide strict technical criteria for determining whether major
industrial projects are environmentally viable.230 However, this decision and
resulting law may scare off foreign investors.2 t Foreign markets increasingly
demand strict, functional environmental regulations, thus unclear and unpredictable
legislation may deter foreign investment.232 Requiring mandatory EISs may affect
the future of foreign investment in Chile.z3
A. Implication of Environmental Groups as Watchdogs
As a result of the Supreme Court ruling, citizen suits may become a powerful
tool in the political arena.?3 The CONAMA case was a landmark decision on
various levels.'s Prior to this decision, only those directly affected by projects were
able to make an effective claim.u6 Because Chilean environmental groups were
successfully able to obtain an injunction against a logging project, the decision
provides environmental groups with a great deal of political power.27 Relying on
the reasoning of the court, the premise for citizen suits is that the environment is the
heritage of all citizens.238 The Supreme Court reinforced the constitutional provision
guaranteeing the citizens of Chile the right to live in a pollution free environment.2 9
Essentially, as a result of this decision, businesses may be more reluctant to invest
in Chile knowing that environmental groups not directly impacted by the project
might be able to stop the project2m Consequently, environmentalists have already
served notice that they will use this decision to challenge another U.S. project in
228. See generally Valparaiso, supra note 136 (explaining that the House of Representatives amended the
laws as a result of the CONAMA decision).
229. Id. See Government reaches Agreement on EIS: System: Regulatory Bill Will be Sent to Congress by
Monday (Mar. 25, 1997) <http://www.gekkonet.com/CHIPtrade/nws._EV7l.htm> (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer) [hereinafter Regulatory Bill] (reporting on the legislation mandating EISs).
230. Valparaiso, supra note 136. See Regulatory Bill, supra note 229.
231. Regulatory Bill, supra note 229.
232. Id.
233. See generally id. (implying that mandatory EISs could serve as a deterrent to foreign investment in Chile
because of the time, effort and money needed to compile such a document).
234. See Heather Walsh, Court Ruling Prompts Ecology Regulations. EARTH TMES NEWS SERVICE. (May
11, 1997) <http://earthtimes.org/may/americaschilecourtrulingmayl l97.htm> (copy on filewith The Transnational
Lawyer) (interpreting the decision such that outsiders, not just those party to the suit, may affect litigation).
235. See generally CONAMA decision, supra note 4.
236. See Walsh, supra note 234 (quoting Fernando Dougnac, an environmental lawyer who won the Trillium
case, who said the ruling gives citizens the right to file an injunction against a project when the government does
not fulfil its obligations to protect the environment).
237. Id.
238. Id. See Array, supra note 5.
239. See Walsh, supra note 234; see also Constitution, supra note 87, art. 19.
240. See Array, supra note 5 (reporting that the business community is up in arms about the new
environmental regulations).
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Santiago.2 4 By giving every Chilean citizen the ability to bring suit to halt projects
affecting the environment, the Chilean government created a powerful watchdog to
act as a check on the government and possibly as a deterrent to foreign
investment.242
B. New Legislation Passed
As a result of the decision, the legislature imposed environmental regulations.243
In light of the constitutional right to live in a pollution-free environment,244 the
government imposed legislation making foreign investment and development much
more difficult in Chile.245 Members of the House of Representatives are displeased
with the effects of this decision and have created regulations so as to prevent future
damage to Chile's credibility and security with its international commitments.246
Foreign investors want to invest in a nation knowing that its policies and laws are
predictable.247 Resulting from the recent Supreme Court decision, Chile passed
legislation mandating EISs248 for all development projects.249
Mandatory EISs may potentially deter investors." The process of compiling
an EIS requires a great deal of time, effort and money.2' Total investment in
241. See id. (suggesting that environmentalists in Chile plan to use citizen suits as a mean to challenge more
projects, such as a US$1 billion forestry project and power plant in Santiago).
242. See generally Walsh, supra note 234 (implying that business and industry are fuming over the ruling
which undermines the credibility of the government).
243. Valparaiso, supra note 136.
244. Constitution, supra note 87.
245. See generally Array, supra note 5 (discussing Chile's new environmental legislation and its impact on
the economy).
246. See Valparaiso, supra note 136 (stating that "under these circumstances and as made clear in a
systematic manner...by the members from the (Commission for Natural Resources, National Assets and
Environment) and from the House of Representatives, it is an unavoidable duty that the (General Comptrollership
of the Republic) and the CONAMA definitely resolve any difference which was produced in respect to the approval
of the corresponding regulation, so as to resolve situations as the one set forth in respect to the Rio Condor project,
which naturally we do not share and would not like to have repeated, due to the damage it caused to the credibility
and security which, without a doubt, has damaged the government's credibility in all of its international
commitments"). More so considering the great efforts carried out to ensure reasonable balance between growth,
equity and sustainability. Id.
247. See id. (suggesting that investment in any nation is risky, but even more so when the nation does not
have a uniform legal system providing security and stability to investors).
248. EFL, supra note 68, at tit. II, para. 2. art. 8, 10(a)-(r) (defining EIS).
249. Id. See Paez, supra note 101, at 633 n.60 (describing the list of projects or activities subject to the
Environmental Impact Assessment System as including water supply and storage systems, power lines and their
substations, electric power plants capable of producing an output greater than three megawatts, nuclear reactors,
land, water and air transportation terminals, development projects, mining operations, carbon fuel facilities,
manufacturing facilities, agro-industry facilities, forestry development sites, hydrobiological projects, hazardous
materials handling operations, sanitation projects, park/reserve projects, and operations dealing with the application
of chemicals).
' 250. See Regulatory Bill, supra note 229 (discussing the effects of a mandatory environmental assessment
system).
251. Id.
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compiling EISs to date exceeds US$19 billion.' 2 The companies proposing the
development are responsible for financing the EIS.z 3 Therefore the requirement of
an EIS increases the cost of investing in Chile.2 Foreign investment may decrease
in Chile because of investors not wanting to commit the time and money to comply
with the mandatory EIS law.25
According to Article 14 of the Civil Code, Chilean law is binding on all
inhabitants of the Republic including aliens25 6 Therefore foreign corporations need
not be citizens of Chile in order to be subject to Chilean law. 2 7 A corporation
formed abroad is recognized such that the corporation can sue and be sued in
Chile.2 8 However, in order to engage in active business, the corporation must
establish a branch in Chile. 9 Therefore, by law foreign corporations developing in
Chile are required to submit an EIS in compliance with Chilean legislation.26
C. How Protecting the Environment Will Effect Foreign Investment
In 1996, the Chilean government took steps to provide for the preservation of
the environment and natural resources of the country, against the competing interest
of foreign investment.261 In 1994, the Central Bank of Chile, encouraged by the
World Bank2 62 began to develop balance sheets, also known as "green" accounts to
document the rate the country's reserves of forests, minerals and fish were being
depleted and to estimate the environmental costs of such depletion. 263 Given the
primitive methods of forest management prevalent in Chile,264 these studies
indicated that no trees suitable for logging would exist in twenty-five to thirty
years.265 A major disincentive to the conservation of rainforests was the traditional
252. See id. (noting that EISs are costly and these costs are incurred by the companies proposing the project).
253. Id.
254. See generally id. (implying that investors must pay for the development and must finance the
environmental study and HIS).
255. Md
256. See Albert S. Golbert and Yenny Nun, Latin American Laws and Institutions (1982) at 415; see also
Regulatory Bill, supra note 229.
257. Golbert & Nun, supra note 256, at 415.
258. Id. at433.
259. l
260. Id. at 415.
261. Findley, supra note 56, at 19.
262. See id. (declaring that the World Bank offered soft loans to promote environmental planning).
263. Id.
264. See id at 17 (theorizing that Chile's method of forest management involved wholesale cutting and
burning without reforestation); see also WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 990 (9th ed. 1991) (defining
reforestation as the action of renewing forest cover by planting seeds or young trees).
265. See Findley, supra note 56, at 19 n.16 (claiming that in response to the studies predicting the depletion
of the Chilean forests, Chile's forestry industry questioned the Central Bank's methods and figures, as well as
questioned the credentials of the economist who headed the environmental accounting unit). As a result of the
industry's vigorous questioning, the lead economist resigned and the Central Bank's directors vacillated their
commitment to the continuation of the unit. Id.; see also Chile: Forest Fire, THE ECONOMIST, 37 (Feb 3, 1996)
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system of national income and asset accounts used to compute national gross
domestic product (GDP) and to measure the success of national governments and
their economic policies.26 Therefore, developing nations such as Chile tend to be
more concerned with a high GDP rather than protecting the environment.267
In fact, local politicians tend to respond favorably to development interests
seeking to exploit rainforests.268 Strong, urban Environmental Non-Governmental
Organizations (ENGO) primarily have political influence with the national govern-
ment. Thus, ralnforest conversation remains primarily within the province of
national elites rather than of local residents.269 Such is true with the CONAMA
decision, where the environmental groups sued the Chilean Government, most
specifically CONAMA, and effectuated a repeal of the approval of Trillium's
logging project.270 The Supreme Court ruling has thrown into question the legality
of over a hundred other projects approved by CONAMA before the new regulation
came into being.27 1 By striking down CONAMA's approval of the EIS, the Chilean
Supreme Court essentially undermined its own legislative authority.272 In 1996
alone, CONAMA approved US$3.4 billion in new projects.273 Under the perspective
of the Supreme Court's resolution, EISs which have been carried out or are to be
carried out, would have no validity while the corresponding regulation is not
enacted. 4 This decision produced a sort of deadlock of various projects, even
though developers complied with the demands established by law.275 By under-
mining its own legislative and administrative authority, this Supreme Court decision
[hereinafter Forest Fire] (depicting Chile's current forestry resources).
266. See Findley, supra note 56, at 21 (reporting that the model balance sheet in the United Nations System
of National Accounts (SNA), which the Chilean Central Bank recently employed, recognizes biodiversity and
minerals as economic assets to be included in a nation's capital stock, however the SNA income and product
accounts do not). Ironically, low-income countries which are typically most dependant on natural resources for
employment, revenues, and foreign exchange earning, are instructed to use a national accounting system that
ignores their principal assets. Id.
267. See generally id. (implying that Chile's focus has centered on the economy rather than the environment).
268. Findley, supra note 56, at 21. But see CONAMA decision, supra note 4 (indicating that four legislators
brought this environmental protection suit against the government).
269. Id. at22.
270. See generally CONAMA decision, supra note 4.
271. Walsh, supra note 234. See Rbgulatory Bill, supra note 229 (stating that between 1990 and the end of
January 1997, 171 projects in various industries have submitted to the environmental evaluation system); see also
Array, supra note 5 (explaining that the decision raised questions about the legality of CONAMA's approval
procedures and opened the door for judicial reviews of scores of other projects approved by CONAMA). An
examination into this issue is beyond the scope of this comment. However, it is worthwhile to mention that in light
of undermining CONAMA's authority, foreign investors may be deterred from investing in Chile because of the
lack of uniformity and stability in the application of environmental laws, most specifically the environmental
evaluation system. Id.
272. See generally Supreme Court Sinks, supra note 198 (indicating that because the Chilean Supreme Court
found CONAMA and COREMA devoid of legal authority to approve, the Court undermined the power of the
government that created these institutions for the purpose of environmental protection and regulation).
273. Id
274. Valparaiso, supra note 136.
275. Id.
1998 /Mandatory Environmental Impact Statements In Chile
may discourage foreign investment because investors want the security of knowing
the agency they are dealing with and the procedures they are following have legal
significance." 6
The major interpretation of this Supreme Court ruling allows litigation not only
by those who are directly affected by projects, but also by outsiders.277 According
to the Chilean Constitution which guarantees a fundamental right to live in a
pollution free environment, 28 Chilean citizens have the power to challenge projects
adversely affecting the environment under this recent Supreme Court decision.279
The ramifications of such 'power may be that environmental concerns can
potentially outweigh the nation's desire to encourage foreign investment.20 Busi-
nesses in Chile are angry over this decision giving citizens the right to file an
injunction against a project saying it undermines the credibility of the government
and creates "an atmosphere of incredulity on the part of the private sector.t28
The decision subverts the environmental policies which favor the current
government and the enormous impact it can produce in the institutional order has
not been determined. 8 2 The day after the decision was handed down, Trillium Cor-
poration gave a statement that it invested in Chile for its political and economic
stability and for its interest in establishing clear guidelines to protect the
environment as well as an unrestricted respect for private property.23 "Nonetheless,
we find ourselves ensnared in a legal dispute.., investors and the environment are
left unprotected. 2 4 The very essence of why corporations have ventured into Chile
has now been destroyed with this decision and subsequent legislation. 285 The
business community is irate about the new environmental regulations and this
decision may create a loss of credibility in the-eyes of foreign investors.5 6 Other
potential foreign investors may express Trillium's same sentiment. Corporations
may learn from this event and refrain from investing or developing in Chile. 287
276. See generally CONAMA decision, supra note4 (holding that the decisions of the administrative agencies
decisions were illegal because they had no legislative authority to make such decisions).
277. Walsh, supra note 234.
278. Constitution, supra note 87, art. 19, § 8.
279. CONAMA decision, supra note 4.
280. Walsh, supra note 234.
281. See id. (quoting Pedro Lizana, President of Sofofa, the manufacturing association); see alsoArray supra
note 5.
282. Valparaiso, supra note 136.
283. Walsh, supra note 234.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Array, supra note 5.
287. See generally Supreme Court Sinks, supra note 198 (stating that Trillium invested in Chile because of
a solid economy and constitutional framework). In light of the attack on Chile's environmental process, more people
may review their investments and projects more heavily than before such discontent. Id; see also Government
Worries Trillium Decision Bad For Investment (Mar. 21, 1997) <http://www.gekkonet.com/CHIPtrade/
newsFR71lhtm> (translated news from ELMERCURTO and LA EPOCA, Chilean newspapers) (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer) [hereinafter Government Worries] (arguing that the Chilean Supreme Court decision siding
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Chile's insertion into international markets may be adversely affected as this
decision discourages the participation of investors in important areas of
production.' 8
Furthermore, while potential future investors may hesitate before investing in
Chile, the Supreme Court decision also discourages environmentally viable
projects. The decision to approve Trillium's EIS was mistaken because the EIS was
not fully researched.289 However, the proposed Rio Condor Project was not
completely an anti-environment project.29 In fact, Trillium was planning to
implement an innovative sustainable development plan.291 Even Chilean officials
admit this decision provides disincentives to those who comply with environmental
procedures.2"
On March 27, 1997 Vivianne Blanlot, executive director of CONAMA, has
suggested to their regional counterparts, COREMA, that they suspend all decisions
on pending EISs in light of the recent Supreme Court decision. 93 The Supreme
Court decision severely damaged CONAMA's reputation. According to Robert
Manne, President of Bayside, Trillium's parent company, the verdict undermines
the environmental evaluation system, making CONAMA and COREMA virtually
non-existent.294
Both Silva Vera, governor of Chile's Region XII, and Chile's President
Eduardo Frei have given their approval for the continuation to Trillium's Rio
Condor Project.29s Trillium executives are expected to re-release their original EIS
to COREMA who will have 120 days to reach a decision.296 According to Trillium
executive, Robert Manne, the Rio Condor Project would employ nearly 10% of the
total workforce in Tierra del Fuego and would enable Chile to be the world's leader
in environmentally conscious, forest land management.297
against forestry company Trillium could be a disincentive for companies to invest in environmentally sustainable
projects).
288. Valparaiso, supra note 136.
289. See CONAMA decision, supra note 4 (regarding the restoration plan and sustainability of harvesting the
lenga forest).
290. Id.
291. See Dietrich, supra note 144.
292. See Government Worries, supra note 287 (referring to Trillium's submission of a voluntary EIS prior
to the enactment of mandatory EIS).
293. CONAMA Decides to Suspend All EIS Decisions, Headline News@ Americas (Mar. 27, 1997)
<http:lwww.atamericas.comlpageslnews/970326/cor.htm> (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer)
[hereinafter CONAMA Decides].
294. See Government Worries, supra note 287 (explaining that Trillium had devoted a year to making forest
management plans as though CONAMA existed, however if CONAMA had any authority its approval would not
have been overturned by the Supreme Court).
295. Government Backs Trillium Project, Headline News@ Americas (Apr. 7, 1997) <http://www.
atamericas.com/pages/news/970407/tri198.htm> (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) [hereinafter
Government Backs].
296. Id.
297. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
The CONAMA decision may significantly impact the future foreign investment
in Chile.298 Chile's dedication to the environment and preservation of natural
resources may be a model for other South American countries to follow.2" Such
strict environmental protections may discourage present foreign investors from con-
tinuing to invest and develop in Chile, thereby damaging the Chilean economy. °°
Additionally, protective measures may deter future foreign investments because in-
vestors might not want to partake in the costly and timely EIS process.301
Chile, once a developing nation hungry for foreign investment, is now, in light
of the recent Supreme Court decision, on the brink of potentially discouraging
foreign investors.0 2 Based upon the recent Supreme Court decision, repealing
approval of a massive logging project, Chile's priorities may have shifted from
encouraging foreign investment above all else towards a more sustainable model of
economic development.0 3 Although Chile is a developing nation and not yet
wealthy enough to put environmental concerns in the forefront of development, the
trend appears to slant in such a direction.
Looking at the specifics of the logging project, it can be deduced that Chile will
heavily weigh the environmental impacts against business developments in the
future .3 04 To illustrate, Tierra del Fuego was a remote area with little vegetation and
according to Trillium the impacts appeared to be slight 5.30 Despite the benefits to
the nation, the government with pressure from environmental groups, repealed
approval of the project. Not only did the Supreme Court make such a decision, but
this decision was the basis for subsequent legislation making EISs mandatory.0 6
Although in the past, EISs were submitted prior to project approval, the creation
of strict regulations, coupled with the great deal of attention environmental impacts
now have in Chile, may decrease desirability of Chile as an ideal destination for
investment.37 Tougher environmental laws are generally viewed by businessmen
298. See Valparaiso. supra note 136 (declaring that the enormous impact has not been diminished and Chile's
insertion into international markets may be affected because this decision discourages the participation ofinvestors).
299. See generally Arturo C. Porzecanski, Is Chile Still a Model for Latin America? LATIN AM. L. & Bus.
RnT. vol. 5, no. 8 (Aug. 31, 1997) (stating that before Chile can be admitted into NAFTA it must rework and
strengthen its environmental regulations, but this issue is outside the scope of this comment).
300. Valparaiso, supra note 136.
301. See generallyRegulatoryBill, supra note 229 (noting that the legislation mandating EIs may adversely
affect foreign investment because it will be more costly to invest in Chile by having to prepare an EIS).
302. See CONAMA decision, supra note 4.
303. See generally id. (implying that environmentalists can halt proposed projects in Chile).
304. See id (striking down a multi-million dollar forestry project based upon a technicality in the EIS
submitted). The CONAMA case demonstrates an environmental victory over development within Chile. Id.
305. Trillium Project, supra note 151.
306. See CONAMA decision, supra note 4.
307. Array, supra note 5.
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as a way to stunt continued economic success. 3°8 In fact, environmental regulations
are infamously known for their ability to impede trade, decrease investment
opportunities, and create large expenses for the manufacturer.309 Foreign investors
may be reluctant to invest in projects that may be tied up in the courts for years over
battle with environmentalists.310 The previous speedy system of approval of foreign
investments may also be hindered with the submission of lengthy EISs, which take
a great deal of time to research and compile. Consequently, companies like Trillium
may no longer be able to afford to take a risk on projects in the nation of Chile and
thus foreign investment in Chile may decrease.3a
308. See Bivona, supra note 18, at 172; see also Chile: Environmental Issues One Hurdle Slowing Chilean
Entry Into NAFTA, BNA INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DAILY (Sept. 25, 1995) at d3 [hereinafter
Environmental Issues] (describing environmental laws as a hurdle to free trade).
309. See Bivona, supra note 18, at 172; see also Christine Buff, NAFTA Meets NEPA: Trade and The
Environment in the 1990s 34 NAT. RESC. J. 179, 183 (1994).
310. See Bivona, supra note 18, at 172; see also Environmental Issues, supra note 308, at d3.
311. Dietrich, supra note 144.

